

administration, which eventually concluded with Libya's renunciation of unconventional weapons in December 2003. The welcome decision of the Qaddafi regime to disarm and rejoin the international community was a victory not for a strategy of preemptive strikes, military confrontation, or bilateral sanctions, but for traditional methods of combating nuclear proliferation.

El Dorado Canyon is often a good read, especially in its treatment of military events. However, it is not well balanced and thorough in its treatment of both the causes and results of military action. Additional research on the diplomatic and political side of events during the Reagan administration would have resulted in a more accurate and complete treatment of the American–Libyan relationship during the 1980s. It would also have helped to clarify the significance of those events to U.S. policy toward Libya in the succeeding decade. While the book will find an audience within the general public, especially among the military community, it cannot be recommended for serious students of American foreign policy in general and American–Libyan relations in particular.

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LAWRENCE ZIRING, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003). Pp. 397. \$39.95 cloth.

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Lawrence Ziring's *Pakistan* is a breath of fresh air at a time of never-ending media reports and books in the United States and Europe that portray a "fundamentalist and nuclear armed Pakistan" as the "real rogue" state and, in the eyes of some, a threat larger than Iraq. Ziring provides a synthesized view of Pakistan's history, politics, and complexity of society, and of the changing dynamics of U.S.–Pakistan relations. He is incisive in capturing and analyzing the Pakistani paradox—the tensions between the promise of a liberal, democratic, and modern nation-state and the peril of a potentially Islamist and Talibanized Pakistan. He uncovers how Islamic extremism and religious groups gained momentum and why it is more crucial for Pakistan to succeed today than ever before.

Ziring has devoted forty years of his life to exploring and understanding the complexities and predilections of Pakistani society, state, and politics. The title of his 1980 book characterized Pakistan as an "enigma of political development." Today he finds Pakistan at the "crosscurrent of history" and cautions that the juncture is not only critical for Pakistan and its neighbors but that it also has implications for the global community. Ziring displays cautious optimism, and that merits attention.

From Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan) to General Pervez Musharraf, Ziring notes, Pakistan has had some leaders of good intent and sincerity of purpose who could not muster strength or show enough faith in the democratic ideal, thereby missing opportunities to change Pakistan into a democratic polity. Ziring is perceptive and insightful in analyzing and interpreting the infirmities, missed opportunities, and competing visions about Pakistan. Jinnah, Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and General Musharraf emerge as liberal modernist leaders struggling—and, in a limited way, succeeding—in providing some progressive and liberal framework. However, none of them, in Ziring's estimation, could demonstrate faith in upholding the principles of democratic governance (tolerance for dissent and minorities and respect for rule of law). He is particularly unforgiving of Bhutto, who had a popular support base and was instrumental in producing the 1973 constitution. Bhutto failed to show respect for the

constitution and squandered an opportunity to move Pakistan to a possible parliamentary democracy. Under Bhutto (1971–77), Pakistan showed signs of social liberalism, an independent foreign policy, and an authoritarian civilian rule. Ziring glosses over social liberalism and independent foreign policy. He struggles to comprehend the enormity of these changes and concludes that, during and after Bhutto's overthrow, so much attention was focused on the person of Bhutto and his rule that "little energy remain[ed] to fathom what Pakistan had become since the civil war" (p. 163). In my view, Bhutto's socialist rhetoric, policies of socioeconomic reform, and independent foreign policy so alarmed the military and the Islamist forces that they began to collaborate actively with one another.

General Zia ul-Haq's military coup and regime (1977–88) targeted the liberal and progressive face of Bhutto's authoritarian rule. Zia displaced that face by coalescing religious groups and pursuing Islamization of Pakistan's state and society. The external environment (i.e., the Iranian Revolution and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979) helped the resurgence of Islamic groups in Pakistan. "Zia envisioned a new Pakistan that he believed could become a model to all the Muslim nations" (p. 172). Zia stated that Islam was the only "integral factor that linked Pakistanis with one another, and also Pakistan with the Muslims of Afghanistan" (p. 176). His Islamization portrayed Pakistan as an Islamist, repressive, and authoritarian state, widening the gap between Jinnah's vision and Zia's reality and discrediting the relatively progressive, liberal, and somewhat reformist but autocratic civilian regime of Bhutto.

To put the rise of Islamic extremism and terrorist groups in proper context, Ziring links together domestic and external factors. He persuasively argues that Zia's Islamization policies, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan transformed Pakistan. These external and internal changes paved the way for an ideological and strategic partnership between the United States and Pakistan. (Chapters 6, 8, and 9 provide graphic details.) The Afghan war (1979–89) became the pivot of this new relationship. The U.S. objective was clear and narrow. Ziring boldly argues, "The CIA's sole mission was the defeat of the Red Army, and the United States became party to an alliance that promoted the most aggressive form of Islamic fundamentalism" (p. 181). Zia was the principal architect of Pakistan's tilt toward Islamism, while the United States and Saudi Arabia, respectively, served as the facilitator/patron and financial/ideological benefactor of the Afghan mujahideen. Today, countless studies reinforce this argument, including Hasan Abbas's *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror* (2004) and Steve Coll's *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (2004).

Ziring is uncomfortably sympathetic toward the military-led regimes in Pakistan and generally dismissive of the civilian political leaders and political parties. As a realist, he recognizes Pakistani cultural dispensations and limitations of Western liberal democracy in non-Western societies, but then hastens to add that any form of democracy requires politicians and political parties. If Musharraf wants to "reconstruct Pakistan," Ziring argues, "then he has no choice but to invite the free and open play of all the politicians. . . . If the Islamists are to be tolerated in the Pakistan of the future, then certainly this is no time to deny a voice and a place to all those wishing to take part in Pakistani politics. . . . It is time to accept the failures along with the frailties and to nurture a new generation of leaders unencumbered by blind doctrines" (p. 354). This is sound advice. The real test for Musharraf is to recognize the legitimacy of mainstream political parties and their leadership. Would Musharraf rise to the occasion and put Pakistan on its original path of becoming a liberal, modern, and democratic Muslim nation-state?

As its author promises, this book is a "quick read," one that can be read as "a story rather than a scholarly tract." It is an interpretive essay intended not only to broaden understanding

but also to explore consequences. Ziring is both persuasive and passionate in his arguments and interpretations and believes in the promise of Pakistan's potential. He hopes Pakistanis find his work "instructive and positive" and helpful "in the reformulation of ideas about what it means to be a Pakistani at the dawn of a new millennium" (p. xiv). Thus, this book is important for Pakistanis in influential places, particularly the military top brass. Moreover, policymakers, opinion builders, researchers, and students will find the book useful, informative, and insightful, with an eye on Pakistan's future.

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JEFFREY RECORD, *Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004). Pp. 210. \$24.95 cloth.

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Jeffrey Record's analysis of the second war in Iraq, *Dark Victory*, is a scathing critique of the Bush administration's political doctrine of unilateralism and its hasty use of preemptive military force. Record, a former staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, argues that Iraq posed no threat to the United States and that the nation's entry into war was an unnecessarily drastic measure that damaged American interests in the long term. Influenced by neoconservative elements in his administration, Bush was led to fear that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) could ultimately end up in the hands of Osama bin Laden. Record carefully points out that the neoconservative position on Iraq and its possession on WMDs had more to do with a long-standing agenda to spread democracy to the Middle East than with safeguarding the United States against terrorism. The conclusion of the war has brought the administration no closer to achieving its implied or its stated objectives. Inadequate postconflict planning has led to an open-ended occupation. It has also created a situation in Iraq that is so unstable that it has only inspired terrorists to wage a new jihad against the American occupiers.

Record's strength in his analysis of the second Iraqi war lies in his efforts to do exactly what the Bush administration failed to do: situate the current conflict within the context of the events that have been transpiring in the region for the past twelve years. He opens by contending that Saddam Hussein's survival at the end of the 1991 Gulf War constituted a military defeat but also a political victory for his regime. America's mistakes in its Iraq policy began with its failure to support the post-1991 Iraqi revolts and continued with its perpetuation of the ineffective sanctions regime. While Record's criticism of these failings are well presented, he could have extended his argument even further to make the point that it is these same mistakes that created the atmosphere of distrust toward Americans that the Iraqis felt after their "liberation" in April 2003 and that is fueling the insurgency in Iraq today.

Aptly portraying the 2003 Iraq war as a sequel to the 1991 Gulf War, Record carefully demonstrates how the neoconservative officials in the first Bush administration who reemerged in the second were aiming to settle an old score and already working to build a case for war before the 11 September 2001 attacks. Saddam Hussein was not a traditional state sponsor of terrorism. Thus, for the administration to link the war on terror with a war against Iraq, it had to make the case that Iraqi WMDs could spread into the hands of terrorists—a concern that Record easily dismisses with the simple knowledge of how Saddam Hussein's regime operated. He would have been reluctant to deliver the "crown jewels" of his arsenal to